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INTRODUCTION 
In their recent article, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial 
Boilerplate,1 Professors Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Robert E. 
Scott identify a phenomenon found in standardized contracts they 
describe as “contractual black holes.”2 The concept of black holes 
comes from theoretical physics. Under the original hypothesis, the 
gravitational pull of a black hole is so strong that once light or 
information is pulled past an event horizon into a black hole, it cannot 
escape.3 In recent years, the thesis has been reformulated such that the 
current thesis is that some information can escape, but it is so degraded 
that it is virtually useless.4 In their article, Choi, Gulati, and Scott apply 
the black hole concept to certain standardized contractual boilerplate 
provisions. 
A contractual black hole is “a boilerplate term that is reused for 
decades and without reflection merely because it is part of a standard 
form package of terms, [and is thereby] emptied of any recoverable 
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 1. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial 
Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1 (2017). 
 2. Id. at 5. 
 3. Id. at 3 n.2. 
 4. Id. 
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meaning.”5 Closely related to contractual black holes are “contractual 
grey holes.”6 A contractual grey hole is a meaningless variation of a 
boilerplate term that has been repeatedly reused over a long period of 
time such that it “has lost much (but not necessarily all) meaning.”7 In 
short, contractual black holes lack any meaning, while contractual grey 
holes may still contain some meaning, but there is no basis for making 
a legal distinction between the variations in the language that have 
appeared over time.8  
Although their article focuses on pari passu clauses in sovereign 
debt contracts, Choi, Gulati, and Scott note that “[i]nsurance contracts 
appear to be another area with the potential for such terms.”9 They are 
correct. 
Insurance policies are the grandparents of contractual black holes. 
Insurance traces its origins to 2250 B.C. when Babylonian maritime 
traders entered “bottomry” contracts, in which a party loaned money 
to a shipper with the understanding that the money would not be 
repaid if the ship sank or was pirated.10 Bottomry contracts eventually 
evolved into modern insurance and Lloyd’s of London issued the first 
maritime insurance policies in the 1600s.11 Almost 100 years ago, 
insurance policies were the first type of standardized agreement to be 
called “contracts of adhesion.”12 Through rote re-usage, many of the 
terms and conditions contained in insurance policies sold today have 
been in use for decades.13 The continual reuse of antiquated policy 
 
 5. Id. at 3.  
 6. Id. at 4. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 4 n.3. This Essay refers to both contractual black and grey holes as contractual 
black holes despite the minor difference between the two. 
 9. Id. at 7 n.16 (citing Christopher C. French, Understanding Insurance Policies as 
Noncontracts: An Alternative Approach to Drafting and Construing These Unique Financial 
Instruments, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 535, 547–48 (2017)). 
 10. See, e.g., ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING 
INSURANCE LAW 16 (5th ed. 2012) (noting the earliest traces of risk transference resembling 
insurance can be found within ancient Babylonian society). 
 11. Id. at 16–17. 
 12. See Cheryl B. Preston & Eli McCann, Llewellyn Slept Here: A Short History of Sticky 
Contracts and Feudalism, 91 OR. L. REV. 129, 131 (2012) (citing Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery 
of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 (1919) (describing standardized life 
insurance policies as contracts of adhesion)).  
 13. See, e.g., JOHN F. DOBBYN & CHRISTOPHER C. FRENCH, INSURANCE LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL 64 (5th ed. 2015) (“[M]any of the terms and conditions contained in standard form 
policies were drafted many years ago and are reused each time a new version of the policy form 
is issued.”); DONALD S. MALECKI & DAVID D. THAMANN, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY 
COVERAGE GUIDE 363-662 (11th ed. 2015) (reproducing the various iterations of the Insurance 
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language is, in part, due to the frequent application of a strict liability 
version of contra proferentem to the interpretation of insurance 
policies.14 Thus, because changing the policy language could be viewed 
as an admission that the prior language was ambiguous or because the 
existing language already has been held to be unambiguous, insurers 
are naturally reluctant to change policy language that has already been 
interpreted by courts.  
Consequently, insurance policies are particularly susceptible to 
the formation of contractual black holes. Indeed, some courts view 
insurance policies as massive contractual black holes from which only 
a few flashes of light (i.e., meaning) escape.15 To test the hypothesis 
that insurance policies contain, or even embody, contractual black 
holes, this Essay considers four provisions found in commercial 
insurance policies: 1) “Sue and Labor” Clauses, 2) “Ensuing Loss” 
Clauses, 3) “Non-Cumulation” Clauses, and 4) the “Sudden and 
 
Services Office, Inc.’s standard Commercial General Liability policy form that have been used 
for the past 40 years, which reveals the various iterations of the policies contain many provisions 
that are identical or substantially similar); Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The 
Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1113 (2006) (arguing that the 
predictability in the interpretation of policy language by courts incentivizes not changing policy 
language); see also Christopher C. French, The “Non-Cumulation Clause”: An “Other Insurance” 
Clause by Another Name, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 375, 388 (2011) [hereinafter French, “Non-
Cumulation Clause”] (discussing the transfer of the language contained in the non-cumulation 
clause drafted in 1960 to the 1971 version of the policy that is still found in some policies today). 
 14. See Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 
531, 538 (1996) (“The strict liability approach to ambiguity is the principal feature of the hornbook 
statement of contra proferentem . . . . If a policy provision is ‘ambiguous’—reasonably susceptible 
to more than one interpretation by the ordinary reader of the policy—then the . . . interpretation 
more favorable to the insured governs . . . .”); Boardman, supra note 13, at 1113; French, supra 
note 9, at 557–58 (“Unlike in typical contract disputes where contra proferentem [is] a tiebreaker 
when ambiguous policy language cannot be conclusively clarified by extrinsic evidence, most 
courts simply construe any ambiguities in the policy language against the insurer and in favor of 
coverage. [Thus,] contra proferentem . . . in insurance cases has been described as strict liability 
for the insurer.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 15. Although they do not use the term “contractual black hole,” some courts have described 
insurance policies as “incomprehensible” and “a mere flood of darkness and confusion.” See, e.g., 
Storms v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 388 A.2d 578, 580 (N.H. 1978) (“[I]nsurance policies [contain 
such] complex verbiage that ‘they would not be understood by men in general, even if [the policies 
were] subjected to a careful and laborious study. . . . [The policy] would, unless he were an 
extraordinary man, be an inexplicable riddle, a mere flood of darkness and confusion.’” (second 
alteration in original) (third DeLancy v. Rockingham Farmers’ Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 52 N.H. 581, 
587–88 (N.H. 1873))); S.C. Ins. Co. v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 489 S.E.2d 200, 206 (S.C. 
1997) (“Ambiguity and incomprehensibility seem to be the favorite tools of the insurance trade 
in drafting policies. Most are a virtually impenetrable thicket of incomprehensible verbosity.” 
(quoting Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 451 S.W.2d 616, 622 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1970))). 
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Accidental” Pollution Exclusion. These four policy provisions are 
suitable subjects because they either have generated significant 
amounts of litigation with inconsistent court rulings or they are facially 
complex or confusing. An examination of these provisions 
demonstrates that the hypothesis that insurance policies house many 
contractual black holes is both confirmed and refuted. Some policy 
provisions have become contractual black holes, some provisions are 
only apparent contractual black holes,16 and some provisions, while on 
their way to becoming contractual black holes, were saved before their 
original meaning crossed the event horizon. To understand this 
conclusion, this Essay proceeds in two parts. Part I explores how the 
insurance policy drafting process results in the rote reuse of policy 
language. Part II considers the origins and purposes of the four 
provisions at issue, and then analyzes whether each provision has 
become a black hole.  
I.  THE DRAFTING AND ROTE REUSE OF INSURANCE POLICY 
LANGUAGE  
Insurance policies are complex financial instruments drafted by 
insurers and then sold on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.17 An insurance 
organization called the Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO) drafts 
many of the commonly used policy forms and then seeks to have the 
forms approved by state insurance commissioners.18 Insurers pay fees 
 
 16. “Apparent contractual black holes,” as the phrase is used in this Essay, are provisions 
that do not appear to have meaning, but a consensus regarding their meaning can be found in case 
law. 
 17. See, e.g., 1 JEFFREY W. STEMPEL & ERICK S. KNUTSEN, STEMPEL AND KNUTSEN ON 
INSURANCE COVERAGE § 4.06[b], at 4–65 (Wolters Kluwer 4th ed. Supp. 2017) (“In a sense, the 
typical insurance contract is one of ‘super-adhesion’ in that the contract is completely 
standardized and not even reviewed prior to contract formation.”); Michelle Boardman, Insuring 
Understanding: The Tested Language Defense, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1075, 1091 (2010) (describing the 
“hyperstandardization” of insurance policies); Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 
14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 125 (2007) (“[I]n some lines of insurance, all insurance companies provide 
identical coverage on the same take-it-or-leave-it basis.”); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty To Settle, 
76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1153 (1990) (“[P]roperty owner’s liability insurance contracts are 
standardized across insurers in a form few insureds have the power or experience to bargain 
around.”).  
 18. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772 (1993) (“[A]n association 
of approximately 1,400 domestic property and casualty insurers[, ISO] is the almost exclusive 
source of support services in this country for CGL insurance. ISO develops standard policy 
forms . . . ; most CGL insurance written in the United States is written on these forms.” (citation 
omitted)); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 879 n.6 (Fla. 2007) (“The Insurance 
Services Office, Inc., also known as ISO, is an industry organization that promulgates various 
standard insurance policies that are utilized by insurers throughout the country . . . .”).  
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for ISO membership, which allows them to use the policy forms drafted 
by ISO.19  
Much of the policy language used in ISO’s standard forms was 
written decades ago, but ISO continues to recycle the same language 
in subsequent versions of its policies.20 For example, ISO’s 1973 
Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) policy form defines 
“occurrence” as “an accident, including continuous or repeated 
exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property 
damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the 
insured.”21 Forty years later, ISO’s 2013 CGL policy form still defines 
“occurrence” as “an accident, including continuous or repeated 
exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.”22 
Despite being issued 40 years apart, both versions use the phrase “an 
accident, including continuous or repeated exposure.” The minor 
variation in the wording of the phrases is an example of what Choi, 
Gulati, and Scott describe as “encrustation,” where minor changes in 
language do not really affect its legal meaning.23 Notably, even though 
the meaning of the term “accident” has been litigated over and over 
again for decades, which has produced an array of different court 
interpretations of the term, ISO has never bothered to define the term 
in CGL policies.24  
When it comes to seeking guidance regarding the intent of the 
drafters, the original drafters typically cannot be called upon to shed 
 
 19. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND 
REGULATION 36–37 (6th ed. 2015).  
 20. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
 21. See Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. GL 00 02 01 73, Commercial General Liability 
Coverage Form, Definitions (1973), reprinted in MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 13, at 363. 
 22. See Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 00 01 04 13, Commercial General Liability 
Coverage Form, Definition No. 13 (2013), reprinted in MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 13, at 
617. The “expected or intended” language contained in the definition of “occurrence” in the 1973 
policy was moved to the exclusions section of the policy form in 2013: “This insurance does not 
apply to . . . ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ expected or intended from the standpoint of the 
insured.” Id. at 604 (Exclusion 2.a). 
 23. See Choi et al., supra note 1, at 5. 
 24. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. CTC Dev. Corp., 720 So. 2d 1072, 1075 (Fla. 1998) 
(“The difficulty in precisely defining the scope of coverage in liability policies providing coverage 
for ‘accidents’ is not a problem of recent vintage. As Judge Van Nortwick observed . . . few 
insurance policy terms have ‘provoked more controversy in litigation than the word “accident.”’” 
(quoting CTC Dev. Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 704 So. 2d 579, 581 (Fla. Ct. App. 1997) 
(Van Nortwick, J., concurring))). 
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light on the meaning of antiquated policy language.25 They are often 
unidentifiable or have died during the many years that have elapsed 
since they drafted the policy language.26  
Documentation regarding the drafters’ intent is also often 
unavailable.27 The lack of documentation may be intentional by 
insurers because, as a result of the use of a strict liability version of 
contra proferetem with respect to ambiguities in insurance policies, 
insurers always take the position that the policy language is 
unambiguous.28 If the language is unambiguous, then no extrinsic 
evidence is needed or used to interpret it. Consequently, ISO and 
insurers have a good reason not to preserve documentation of intent.  
Insurance law essentially dictates this result. Unlike typical 
contract disputes in which extrinsic evidence regarding the parties’ 
mutual intent is admissible to resolve disputes regarding ambiguous 
contract language, there is no mutual intent to discern with respect to 
insurance policies. Policyholders play no role in the drafting of 
insurance policies and they do not even get a copy of the policies until 
after purchasing them.29 Even the insurers selling the policies typically 
do not know the intent of policy language because they did not draft 
it.30 Thus, because any finding of ambiguity in the policy language 
almost automatically means the insurer loses, policy language can 
never be ambiguous from the insurer’s perspective once a coverage 
dispute arises. 
 
 25. See e.g., DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 13, at 64; see also French, “Non-Cumulation 
Clause,” supra note 13, at 386–89. In an attempt to understand the original drafter’s intent, the 
author relied upon the deposition testimony of an insurance policy drafter, who incorporated 
earlier policy language into a new policy form, regarding the original drafter’s intent because the 
original drafter was dead. See id.  
 26. See id. 
 27. See, e.g., DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 13, at 64 (“Documentation regarding the intent 
of the drafters also rarely exists. Consequently, it often is impossible to discern the original intent 
of the drafters of standard form policy language.”); French, “Non-Cumulation Clause,” supra note 
13, at 386–89 (relying upon secondhand deposition testimony to understand the drafter’s intent 
regarding the non-cumulation clause because of a lack of documentary evidence).  
 28. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 29. See Boardman, supra note 13, at 1120; French, supra note 9, at 537, 548 (citing Eugene 
R. Anderson & James J. Fournier, Why Courts Enforce Insurance Policyholders’ Objectively 
Reasonable Expectations of Insurance Coverage, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 335, 363 (1998)).  
 30. See supra notes 18–20, 25–26 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b. (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Employees regularly using a form often 
have only a limited understanding of its terms and limited authority to vary them.”); Anderson & 
Fournier, supra note 29, at 364. 
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Another disincentive to redrafting and modernizing policy 
language is that doing so could be viewed as an admission that the older 
policy language is either unclear or actually covers the types of losses 
the insurer has been contending it does not.31 Thus, redrafting and 
modernizing the language could lead to insurers losing future cases 
decided under the older policy language. This leads to the rote reuse of 
the same policy language decade after decade.  
Some scholars also have theorized that insurers are reluctant to 
redraft old policy language because their actuarial data, and thus 
premiums, are based upon the language already in use.32 This argument 
has intuitive appeal, but it may not be empirically correct. Premiums 
generally are based upon broad factors, such as the nature of the 
policyholder’s business, the size of the policyholder’s operations, the 
policyholder’s number of employees, the policyholder’s gross revenues 
or sales, and the policyholder’s loss history, rather than the granular 
language of specific policy provisions.33 With that said, however, 
insurers routinely add exclusions for certain types of losses they do not 
want to cover if courts begin to interpret their policies to provide such 
coverage.34 So, the idea that insurers have an incentive not to make 
 
 31. See, e.g., Michelle Boardman, Blank, Black, and Grey Holes in Insurance Contracts 17 
(Mar. 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/Boardman%20
Black%20Holes%20in%20Insurance%20Contracts.pdf [https://perma.cc/2N9Z-8CEN] 
(“[I]nsurers are generally unwilling to add specific exclusions in future policies if their position is 
that the previous policies did not cover the loss either.”). 
 32. See, e.g., id. at 16 (“Changing contract language may require letting go of, or weakening 
the predictive power of, valuable actuarial data.”); see also Boardman, supra note 13, at 1116 
(“[T]he cost of each clause becomes increasingly clear as actuarial data is collected and pooled.”).  
 33. See, e.g., What Goes into the Price of a General Liability Insurance Policy for Small 
Businesses?, INSUREON BLOG (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.insureon.com/blog/post/2014/03/12/
general-liability-price-factors.aspx [https://perma.cc/9LH9-UJWK] (listing the 8 factors that 
determine premium rates as: 1) “Size and Condition of Your Business Premises, 2) “Type of 
Business Operations/Industry,” 3) “Experience in Your Profession, Field, or Business,” 4) 
Number of Employees,” 5) “Location of Your Business,” 6) “Limits and Deductibles,” 7) “Policy 
Features,” and 8) “Claims History”); see also Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 226 F. Supp. 
3d 537, 542 (W.D.N.C. 2017) (“[The insurer] calculated the final premium (i.e. price) charged to 
[the policyholder] for CGL insurance provided under the [insurer’s] policies based on [the 
policyholder’s] payroll on all of [the policyholder’s] operations. . . .”); Monkey Ridge, LLC v. 
Unigard Ins. Co., No. 2:16-CV-0213, 2016 WL 5864428, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 6, 2016) (“[The 
insurer] calculated the premiums due on the CGL Policy part of the Primary Policy and the 
Umbrella Policy based on the number of properties identified and the acreage of those 
properties.”); Essex Ins. Co. v. Ragland Mills, Inc., No. 06-0737-CV-W, 2008 WL 351014, at *8 
(W.D. Mo. Feb. 6, 2008) (“This premium was calculated based upon the hazards and gross receipts 
of elevator inspection.”). 
 34. See, e.g., Christopher C. French, The Role of the Profit Imperative in Risk Management, 
17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1081, 1096–1114 (2015) (discussing insurers’ additions of exclusions for 
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dramatic changes to policy language may have some merit even if the 
specific wording of individual policy provisions is not part of the 
premium calculation. 
Finally, the meaning of certain provisions in policies also has been 
obfuscated by the incredibly complex structure of policies that has 
developed over time. Consider, for example, ISO’s 2013 CGL policy 
form. When originally conceived and created, the CGL policy form was 
the broadest form of liability coverage available under which the 
insurer agreed to pay “all sums” for which the policyholder became 
liable for “bodily injuries” or “property damage” caused by an 
accident.35 One might expect a policy providing such broad coverage to 
be a simple, short document. That would be a mistake. The 2013 CGL 
policy form contains: three sections setting forth the different types of 
coverage provided, thirty-eight exclusions, nine conditions, and 
twenty-two definitions (not including the two pages it takes to explain 
who is an “insured” under the policy).36  
In sum, the antiquated insurance policy language reused decade 
after decade, combined with the increasing length and complex 
organization of the numerous terms, conditions, and exclusions that are 
cross-referenced throughout, is a recipe for the development of 
contractual black holes.37 The next Part tests this hypothesis by 
considering four policy provisions found in commercial insurance 
policies. 
 
pollution claims, asbestos claims, terrorism claims, Y2K claims, and mold claims after losses 
associated with such claims began to materialize). 
 35. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Assessing the Coverage Carnage: Asbestos Liability and 
Insurance After Three Decades of Dispute, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 349, 358 (2006). Notably, when the 
CGL policy form was first introduced in the 1940s it was called “Comprehensive General 
Liability” insurance. ISO reduced the coverage provided under CGL policies by adding more and 
more exclusions to the policy form over the decades and renamed the policy “Commercial 
General Liability” insurance in 1986, but retained the CGL acronym. Id. at 355. 
 36. See MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 13, at 603–18. 
 37. See Boardman, supra note 17, at 1119 (“It is not just the language of insurance policies 
that makes for difficult reading. The order of the language, the parachronistic structure of the 
policy, and the intimate connection between clauses found in separate ‘sections’ pages apart, 
[make the policy difficult to understand. Thus,] consumer[s] . . . often miss . . . controlling 
clauses.”). 
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II.  EXAMPLES OF POTENTIAL CONTRACTUAL BLACK HOLES IN 
INSURANCE POLICIES 
A. Non-Cumulation Clauses 
The first candidate for contractual black hole status is the Non-
Cumulation Clause that appears in CGL policies. Non-Cumulation 
Clauses are implicated when a loss triggers multiple policy periods, and 
courts and parties must figure out which of the triggered policies are 
liable and for how much.38 Non-Cumulation Clauses are a prime 
example of a policy provision that was first drafted decades ago and, 
through rote reuse, has lost its meaning when interpreted and applied 
in current disputes.  
The Lloyd’s of London Non-Cumulation Clause, which is the 
earliest one used in modern occurrence-based insurance policies, was 
first created in 1960 by Leslie R. Dew and his fellow London 
underwriters.39 The clause originally read as follows:  
C. PRIOR INSURANCE AND NON CUMULATION OF 
LIABILITY 
  It is agreed that if any loss covered hereunder is also covered in 
whole or in part under any other policy issued to the Assured prior to 
the inception date hereof the limit of liability hereon as stated in item 
2 of the Declarations shall be reduced by any amounts due to the 
Assured on account of such loss under such prior policy insurance. 
  Subject to the foregoing paragraph and to all the other terms and 
conditions of this policy in the event that personal injury or property 
damage arising out of an occurrence covered hereunder is continuing 
at the time of termination of this policy Underwriters will continue to 
protect the Assured for liability in respect of such personal injury or 
property damage without payment of additional premium.40 
Prior to 1960 when Lloyd’s of London created the first version of 
modern “occurrence”-based CGL policies, which is the type of CGL 
policy form most commonly used today, CGL policies were “accident”-
based.41 Under accident-based CGL policies, the coverage-triggering 
 
 38. See French, “Non-Cumulation Clause,” supra note 13, at 375–77. 
 39. See id. at 386. 
 40. Id. (quoting Randolph M. Fields, The Underwriting of Unlimited Risk: The London 
Market Umbrella Liability Policy 1950 to 1970, Morgan Owen Medal Essay Submission to the 
Chartered Insurance Institute (1994) (Exhibit 16) (LRD 60 Form Policy, Condition C)). 
 41. Id. at 387; Stempel, supra note 35, at 363. 
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event was an “accident” that gave rise to an injury.42 The policies did 
not define the term “accident.” Consequently, courts had to determine 
what “accident” meant as it was used in the policies.43 The case law was 
developing such that some courts had concluded that accidents were 
not limited in time and space to a single event, but rather, could include 
situations that took place over longer periods of time and caused 
ongoing injuries.44 Consequently, in 1960, the CGL policy form was 
revised to use a defined term of “occurrence” instead of just the 
undefined term “accident.”45 
By changing to occurrence-based insurance, the coverage 
triggering event became an “occurrence,” which originally was defined 
as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 
conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither 
expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.”46 
Significantly, this change to an occurrence-triggering policy form 
meant coverage was expressly provided not only for individual injury-
causing events, but also for gradual injury-causing situations that could 
span long periods of time. As one insurer representative in the 1960s 
explained:  
The definition [of “occurrence”] embraces an injurious exposure to 
conditions which results in injury. Thus, it is no longer necessary that 
the event causing the injury be sudden in character. In most cases, the 
injury will be simultaneous with the exposure. However, in some 
other cases, injuries will take place over a long period of time before 
they become manifest. The slow ingestion of foreign matters and 
inhalation of noxious fumes are examples of injuries of this kind. The 
definition serves to identify the time of loss for application of 
coverage in these cases, viz, the injury must take place during the 
policy period. This means that in exposure-type cases, cases involving 
 
 42. French, “Non-Cumulation Clause,” supra note 13, at 387. 
 43. Stempel, supra note 35, at 363–64. 
 44. See, e.g., Shipman v. Emp’rs. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 125 S.E.2d 72, 75–76 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1962) (explaining that an “accident” may take place over time).  
 45. See, e.g., French, “Non-Cumulation Clause,” supra note 13, at 387; Stempel, supra note 
35, at 364; John J. Tarpey, The New Comprehensive Policy: Some of the Changes, 33 INS. COUNS. 
J. 223, 223 (1966) (“The principal reason given for revision of the [the policy form] was adverse 
court decisions.”). 
 46. See Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. GL 00 02 01 73, Commercial General Liability 
Coverage Form, Definitions (1973), reprinted in MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 13, at 363. 
FRENCH IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/12/2017  4:31 PM 
50 DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [Vol. 67:40 
cumulative injuries, more than one policy contract may come into 
play in determining coverage and its extent under each policy.47 
This extension of coverage created a problem for insurers because 
some injuries simultaneously could be covered under both the older 
accident-based policies and the new occurrence-based policies.48 For 
example, in situations where a court could conclude the coverage 
triggering “accident” under accident-based policies was the defective 
manufacture of a product that subsequently caused an injury, under the 
occurrence-based policies the injuries themselves were the triggering 
event.49 This meant the policyholder could recover under both policy 
forms for the same injury and potentially receive a double recovery.50 
The Non-Cumulation Clause was created to address that problem by 
preventing the policyholder from receiving a windfall double 
recovery.51 
Non-Cumulation Clauses became contractual black holes, 
however, when they continued to be reused decade after decade with 
only minor variations despite the dramatically changing legal and 
scientific landscape. At the time the clause was originally drafted in 
1960, the drafters did not conceive of “long-tail” claims such as the 
asbestos and environmental claims that later arose in the 1970s through 
1990s when the delayed manifestation of the injury-causing effects of 
asbestos exposure became more widely understood and environmental 
laws were passed that created retroactive strict liability for past waste 
generators, haulers, and disposers.52 Nor did, or could, the original 
drafters intend the clause to apply to such claims.53 The clause was 
designed to prevent double recoveries, not to limit recoveries for 
unforeseen long-tail claims.54 
When you attempt to apply Non-Cumulation Clauses to modern 
long-tail claims, where the injury is continuously caused over many 
years, a contractual black hole appears. The clause reads, in part:  
 
 47. Stempel, supra note 35, at 368 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Norman Nachman, The New 
Policy Provisions for General Liability Insurance, 10 CPCU ANNALS 196, 199–200 (1965)). 
Nachman was the manager of casualty insurance and multiple lines insurance at the National 
Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, a predecessor to ISO.  
 48. See French, “Non-Cumulation Clause,” supra note 13, at 387. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. Id. at 387–88. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
FRENCH IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/12/2017  4:31 PM 
2017] BLACK HOLES IN INSURANCE POLICIES 51 
[I]f any loss covered hereunder is also covered in whole or in part 
under any other policy issued to the Assured prior to the inception 
date hereof the limit of liability hereon . . . shall be reduced by any 
amounts due to the Assured on account of such loss under such prior 
policy insurance.55 
The policy language does not specify how to determine whether a loss 
is “covered” under a prior-incepting policy or who makes the 
determination. Nor does it state whether a court judgment is necessary. 
It also does not address whether the prior insurer needs to admit 
liability in order to trigger the clause’s application.  
Further, it is unclear what constitutes an “amount due” under 
prior insurance. It could be an amount that a court has adjudicated is 
due. Or, it could simply be an amount that a subsequent insurer who is 
attempting to avoid liability merely alleges is due from another insurer 
that issued a policy in an earlier policy year. Arguably, it should at least 
be an amount actually paid by a prior insurer for the loss, but the policy 
does not state that. 
In addition, the clause is silent regarding how one should deal with 
settlements in which a prior incepting insurer denies liability but settles 
nonetheless. The clause simply does not address whether settlement 
payments are “amounts due” under a Non-Cumulation Clause. Nor 
does it state whether later incepting insurance policies get credit for the 
actual settlement amounts paid or for the full limits of the policies 
issued by the prior incepting policy. As these examples indicate, Non-
Cumulation Clauses become contractual black holes when they are 
applied to long-tail claims today. 
B. Sue and Labor Clauses 
The second candidate for contractual black hole status is the Sue 
and Labor Clause.56 Sue and Labor Clauses originated in Lloyd’s of 
London’s marine insurance policies in the 1600s.57 A common version 
of a Sue and Labor Clause provides: 
And in case of any Loss o[r] Misfortune, it shall be lawful and 
necessary for the Assured . . . to sue, labor and travel for, in, and about 
the defense, safeguard and recovery of the Vessel, or any part thereof, 
 
 55. French, “Non-Cumulation Clause,” supra note 13, at 386. 
 56. See generally Boardman, supra note 31, at 7–8 (describing the origins and history of Sue 
and Labor Clauses and considering whether they are contractual black holes). 
 57. Id. at 7. 
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without prejudice to this insurance, to the charges whereof the 
Underwriters will contribute their proportion as provided below. . . . 
In the event of expenditure under the Sue and Labor clause, the 
Underwriters shall pay the proportion of such expenses that the 
amount insured hereunder bears to the Agreed Value, or that amount 
insured hereunder (less loss and/or damage payable under this Policy) 
bears to the actual value of the salved property, whichever proportion 
shall be less. . . .58 
The phrase to “sue, labor and travel for,” or some variation of it, has 
been used in marine policies for approximately 400 years.59 The phrase 
also has been transferred to other types of insurance and is now found 
in inland property policies.60  
What does it mean “to sue, labor and travel for, in, and about the 
defense, safeguard and recovery of the [the property], or any part 
thereof?” If you own a ship, on what occasion would you have to “sue, 
labor and travel” to defend or safeguard the ship? Today, the phrase is 
basically meaningless to most people. The phrase appears to have the 
qualities of a contractual black hole.  
With that said, the Sue and Labor Clause is only an apparent 
contractual black hole. Although it has been replicated in insurance 
policies for hundreds of years and appears to be gibberish on its face, 
the clause has not lost its meaning over time. Courts and insurers know 
what it means because its meaning and purpose have been preserved 
through case law. The clause provides coverage to the policyholder for 
the costs the policyholder incurs in an attempt to avoid or minimize an 
occurring or impending loss.61 In short, it is a loss mitigation clause.62 
The odd language used in the clause is a reflection of the times and 
circumstances surrounding its original creation. A ship at sea in the 
 
 58. Ocean Towing Co. da Venezeula v. Cont’l Ins. Co., No. 89-2819, 1992 WL 40788, at *6 
(E.D. La. Feb. 27, 1992). 
 59. See Boardman, supra note 31, at 8. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id.; see also BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON 
INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 21.02[e], at 1739 (18th ed. 2017).  
 62. See, e.g., Albany Ins. Co. v. Anh Thi Kieu, 927 F.2d 882, 894 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Sue and 
labor expenses are sums spent by the assured in an effort to mitigate damages and loss. ‘The 
purpose of the sue and labor clause [in an insurance contract] is to reimburse the insured for those 
expenditures which are made primarily for the benefit of the insurer . . . .’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Blasser Bros., v. N. Pan–Am. Line, 628 F.2d 376, 386 (5th Cir.1980))); Armada Supply 
Inc. v. Wright, 858 F.2d 842, 853 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Sue and labor expenses are those reasonable 
costs borne by the assured to mitigate the loss and thus reduce the amount to be paid by the 
underwriter.”). 
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1600s that encountered a storm or pirates was allowed to do anything 
and everything it could to preserve its cargo and the ship. And, it was 
allowed to recover from the insurer the costs associated with doing so, 
including the “labor” costs incurred and the costs associated with 
“suing” anyone who had salvaged the damaged ship or goods.63 For 
most ship owners today, fending off pirates is not as much of problem 
as it was 400 years ago.  
The subsequent transfer of the clause from marine insurance 
policies to inland property policies without significant revision only 
heightens the potential contractual black hole quality of the clause 
because most property owners do not need to worry about fending off 
pirates or jettisoning cargo during a storm to save property that is on 
land. Indeed, on its face, the language makes little sense in that context. 
So, could insurers update the language to make it more understandable 
and relevant to the circumstances policyholders face today that could 
result in losses? Absolutely, but that does not mean the language has 
completely lost its meaning due to rote reuse over the centuries. There 
is plenty of case law preserving its meaning despite the dated and 
awkward wording.64 So, Sue and Labor Clauses should be viewed as 
only apparent, not real, contractual black holes. 
C. Ensuing Loss Clauses 
The third candidate for contractual black hole status is the 
Ensuing Loss Clause that appears in property policies—both 
homeowners and commercial. Many property policies sold today are 
“all risk” policies, which means they cover any and all losses unless the 
peril causing the loss is specifically excluded.65 Insurers have added 
exclusions to such policies to avoid covering certain perils such as 
earthquakes and floods.66 In addition to specific earthquake and flood 
 
 63. See Boardman, supra note 31, at 8. 
 64. See supra note 62. 
 65. See, e.g., Jeff Katofsky, Subsiding Away: Can California Homeowners Recover from 
Their Insurer for Subsidence Damages to Their Homes?, 20 PAC. L.J. 783, 785 (1989) (“In an ‘all-
risk’ policy, all losses except those specifically excluded are covered. This is the broadest form of 
coverage and has been so interpreted by the courts.” (footnote omitted)). 
 66. See, e.g., Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. HO 00 03 05 11, Exclusion A.2 (2010), 
reprinted in ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 19, at 197 (excluding coverage for “loss caused 
directly or indirectly by . . . [e]arthquake . . . ” and “flood”); Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CP 
10 20 06 07, Commercial Property Broad Form, Exclusion (b) (2007), reprinted in BRUCE J. 
HILLMAN, COMMERCIAL PROPERTY, 404–05 (4th ed. 2009) (noting that commercial all risk 
property policies exclude coverage “for loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by . . . [an] 
[e]arthquake, including any earth sinking, rising or shifting related to such event”); Christopher 
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exclusions, insurers also often include “anti-concurrent causation” 
exclusions in their policies.67 Anti-concurrent causation exclusions 
purport to exclude coverage for losses caused in any part by an 
excluded peril: “This policy does not insure loss or damage caused 
directly or indirectly by any Peril excluded.”68 Thus, under one literal 
reading of an anti-concurrent causation exclusion, if an excluded peril 
plays any role in causing a loss, then the loss arguably is not covered. 
The potential for a contractual black hole to develop in this area 
of insurance arises because policies with anti-concurrent causation 
(and other) exclusions also often contain an exception to such 
exclusions known in the insurance world as an Ensuing Loss Clause.69 
Ensuing Loss Clauses have been in existence since the early 1900s 
when they were created following the 1906 San Francisco fire. Several 
courts refused to enforce anti-concurrent causation exclusions that 
purported to exclude coverage for fire damage—a covered peril—that 
resulted when gas lines were broken by an earthquake—an excluded 
peril.70  
One example of an Ensuing Loss Clause provides: “We insure for 
all risks of physical loss to the property described in Coverage A except 
for loss caused by: [any of the 6 following excluded perils]. Any ensuing 
loss from items 1 through 6 not excluded is covered.”71 Like the term 
“accident,” insurers have chosen not to define the term “ensuing loss” 
in their policies. Readers must thus go to other sources to attempt to 
understand it. A standard dictionary defines “ensue” as: “1. to come 
afterward; follow immediately” or “2. to happen as a consequence; 
result.”72 In other words, the Ensuing Loss Clause reinstates coverage 
for losses that follow as a result of, at least in part, a covered peril even 
if an excluded peril is also part of the causation chain, notwithstanding 
the presence of an anti-concurrent causation exclusion. The confusing, 
and apparently contradictory, language in Ensuing Loss Clauses 
 
C. French, Insuring Floods: The Most Common and Devastating Natural Catastrophes in America, 
60 VILL. L. REV. 53, 61 (2015) (“Almost uniformly, [insurers] have refused to insure flood losses 
for non-commercial entities despite selling ‘all risk’ homeowners property policies.”). 
 67. See Christopher C. French, The “Ensuing Loss” Clause in Insurance Policies: The 
Forgotten and Misunderstood Antidote to Anti-Concurrent Causation Exclusions, 13 NEV. L.J. 
215, 216 (2012). 
 68. Blaine Constr. Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 171 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting 
insurance policy at issue). 
 69. See French, supra note 67, at 217. 
 70. See id. at 216–17. 
 71. Roberts v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 705 P.2d 1335, 1336 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc). 
 72. Ensue, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2014). 
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combined with inconsistent anti-concurrent causation exclusions 
creates the right setting for the formation of a contractual black hole.  
Indeed, on its face, an Ensuing Loss Clause is a contractual black 
hole. The wording alone allows almost no light into the meaning for 
the reader. In a world where every loss is caused by numerous events, 
how can a loss that is “caused directly or indirectly by any Peril 
excluded” be excluded from coverage under an anti-concurrent 
exclusion,73 while simultaneously be covered under an Ensuing Loss 
Clause? From this contractual black hole, courts are left with the 
fruitless task of divining meaning. 
Not surprisingly, Ensuing Loss Clauses have flummoxed courts.74 
In determining coverage, some courts simply default to the “efficient 
proximate cause” doctrine to determine whether a covered or an 
excluded peril is the first or dominant cause of the loss.75 Other courts 
look at whether there was a separate and intervening covered peril that 
caused the loss.76 And other courts simply analyze whether a covered 
peril played any role in causing the loss.77 If it did, then there is 
coverage. Interestingly, despite the inconsistency between anti-
concurrent causation exclusions and Ensuing Loss Clauses, many 
courts have held that Ensuing Loss Clauses are unambiguous and, by 
implication, not contractual black holes. Courts have reached such 
 
 73. Blaine Constr. Corp., 171 F.3d at 346 (quoting insurance policy at issue). 
 74. See French, supra note 67, at 228–34 (collecting cases). 
 75. As one court stated:  
The efficient proximate cause rule operates as an interpretive tool to establish coverage 
when a covered peril “sets other causes into motion which, in an unbroken sequence, 
produce the result for which recovery is sought.” The opposite proposition, however, 
is not a rule of law. When an excluded peril sets in motion a causal chain that includes 
covered perils, the efficient proximate cause rule does not mandate exclusion of the 
loss. “[T]he efficient proximate cause rule operates in favor of coverage. A converse 
rule would, of course, operate in favor of no coverage. . . . Because policies should 
normally be construed in favor of coverage, because there is no settled law favoring 
this argument, contrary to the insurer’s claim, and because the insurer does not offer 
any further justification or authority supporting such a rule, we decline to adopt the 
rule urged by the insurer.”  
Vision One, LLC v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 276 P.3d 300, 309 (Wash. 2012) (en banc) (first quoting 
McDonald v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 837 P.2d 1000, 1004 (Wash. 1992) (en banc); then 
quoting Key Tronic Corp. v. Aetna (Cigna) Fire Underwriters Ins. Co., 881 P.2d 201, 206 (Wash. 
1994) (en banc)). 
 76. See, e.g., Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 845 So. 2d 161, 167–68 (Fla. 2003) 
(holding that the repair of structural deficiencies due to design defects was not an ensuing loss 
because there was no property damage separate from the defects themselves). 
 77. See, e.g., Roberts v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 705 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Ariz. 1985) (en 
banc) (holding that damages caused by bees, an excluded peril, were covered due to an ensuing 
loss provision because the damage caused by honey leaking from the bees’ hive “ensued”—
resulted—after the bees had been exterminated). 
FRENCH IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/12/2017  4:31 PM 
56 DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [Vol. 67:40 
conclusions even though they have interpreted the clauses 
inconsistently and made inconsistent coverage determinations when 
applying them.78 
In sum, the Ensuing Loss Clause is a better candidate for 
contractual black hole status than the Sue and Labor Clause. Although 
the origin of the Ensuing Loss Clause is known, unlike the wording of 
the Sue and Labor Clause, the wording of an Ensuing Loss Clause is 
confusing and contradictory when read together with an anti-
concurrent causation exclusion. In addition, unlike the Sue and Labor 
Clause, there is a lack of consensus among courts regarding its meaning 
and application. 
D. The Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion 
The final candidate for contractual black hole status is the Sudden 
and Accidental Pollution Exclusion that ISO used in its CGL policy 
form between 1973 and 1986 and was frequently litigated during the 
1990s. The exclusion is worth discussing here, not because the language 
in the exclusion has lost its meaning due to decades of rote reuse, but 
rather, as an example of the dynamic that can lead to the creation of 
insurance contractual black holes.  
As discussed in Part II.A, after insurers changed the CGL policy 
form from accident-based to occurrence-based in the 1960s, CGL 
policies unquestionably covered injuries that resulted from ongoing 
injury-causing processes, as opposed to just accidental “events.”79 
Consequently, environmental damage claims were covered so long as 
they were unexpected and unintended: 
The standard, occurrence-based policy thus covered property damage 
resulting from gradual pollution. So long as the ultimate loss was 
neither expected nor intended, courts generally extended coverage to 
all pollution-related damage, even if it arose from the intentional 
discharge of pollutants.80 
Indeed, when insurers changed the CGL policy form from 
accident-based to occurrence-based in the 1960s, insurers actually 
marketed the new policies as covering gradual injury-causing situations 
 
 78. Compare Roberts, 705 P.2d at 1337, with Swire Pac. Holdings, 845 So. 2d at 166. 
 79. See supra Part II.A. 
 80. New Castle Cty. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1197 (3d Cir. 1991), 
abrogated by N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Aardvark Assocs., Inc., 942 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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such as pollution so long as the injury was not expected or intended by 
the policyholder.81  
For example, in 1965, Gilbert Bean, a former executive of a major 
insurer and a member of a committee that was responsible for 
reviewing and drafting policy language, stated the following with 
respect to whether the new CGL policy form covered environmental 
claims: “Manufacturing risks producing insecticides, plant foods, 
fertilizers, weed killers, paints, chemicals, thermostats or other 
regulatory devices, to name a few, have created gradual [property 
damage] exposure. They need this protection and should legitimately 
expect to be able to buy it, so we have included it.”82 A year later in 
1966, Mr. Bean similarly wrote: “[There is] coverage for gradual 
[bodily injury] or gradual [property damage] resulting over a period of 
time from exposure to the insured’s waste disposal. Examples would 
be gradual adverse effect of smoke, fumes, air or stream pollution, 
contamination of water supply or vegetation.”83 
One contemporaneous insurance policy manual that was used to 
explain the coverage provided under the CGL policy form had the 
following hypothetical as an example of an “occurrence” that would be 
covered under the new occurrence-based policy form: 
Wilson Chemical Company, the Named Insured, Occupies the 
Second Floor of a Commercial Building Owned by West End 
Cleaners. The West End Operation Occupies the Entire First Floor. 
Wilson Chemical used Acid as a raw material. The acid is stored in 
100 gallon drums on the second floor. One storage drum developed a 
leak allowing acid to drip onto the floor. This eventually caused 
extensive damage to several structural supports of the building and 
caused a partial collapse which destroyed much of West End’s 
 
 81. See, e.g., Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W. 2d 570, 574 (Wis. 1990) (“At least with 
respect to environmental claims, contemporaneous industry commentary on the 1966 CGL policy 
indicates that there was no intent to avoid coverage for unexpected or unintended pollution.”); 
Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 849–71 (N.J. 1993) (discussing 
the evidence, commentators’ views, and case law regarding coverage for environmental injuries 
under the 1966 CGL policy form); see also Thomas Reiter, David Strasser & William Pohlman, 
The Pollution Exclusion Under Ohio Law: Staying The Course, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1165, 1191–93 
(1991) (discussing coverage for environmental claims under occurrence-based CGL policies and 
the history of insurers’ positions regarding such coverage). 
 82. Robert Saylor & David Zolensky, Pollution Coverage and the Intent of the CGL Drafters: 
The Effect of Living Backwards, 1 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. (INS.) 4425, 4432 (1987) (quoting 
Gilbert Bean, New Comprehensive General and Automobile Program, The Effect on 
Manufacturing Risks, presented at Mutual Insurance Technical Conference (Nov. 15–18, 1965)).  
 83. Id. at 4438 n.34 (1987) (quoting Gilbert Bean, Summary of Broadened Coverage Under 
New CGL Policies With Necessary Limitation To Make This Broadening Possible (1966)).  
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equipment. West End Cleaners Brought a suit against Wilson 
Chemical for the replacement of their equipment. Would Wilson’s 
CGL Policy Pay? 
Yes. This situation would meet the second part of the definition of 
occurrence, as the slow leak of acid constitutes a continuous or 
repeated exposure to conditions.84 
For at least two reasons, the insurers’ appetite for covering 
environmental claims quickly waned. First, several significant 
environmental incidents, such as the Torrey Canyon disaster and the 
Santa Barbara offshore oil spill, created widespread, negative media 
coverage regarding pollution.85 Second, in 1970, Congress passed the 
Federal Water Quality Improvement Act, which imposed strict liability 
for certain discharges into bodies of water.86 Thus, widespread negative 
media attention targeted polluters, and the law began imposing strict 
liability for certain environmental injuries.  
In response to these developments, insurers drafted what is now 
known as the qualified pollution exclusion or Sudden and Accidental 
Pollution Exclusion, which first was used as a policy add-on 
endorsement in 1970 and then became part of the CGL policy form 
itself in 1973.87 The Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion is 
worded as follows: 
This insurance does not apply: . . . (f) to bodily injury or property 
damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of 
smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or 
gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants 
into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of 
 
 84. Stempel, Assessing The Coverage Carnage, supra note 35, at 372 (quoting [ANONYMOUS 
INSURER], THE COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY WORKBOOK 11–12 (1973)). 
 85. See, e.g., Warren Brockmeier, Pollution—The Risk and Insurance Problem, 12 FOR DEF. 
77, 77–78 (1971) (discussing changes to CGL coverage after environmental disasters in the 1960s); 
James Hourihan, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Damage Claims, 15 FORUM 551, 553 
(1980) (“Pollution claims burst on the insurance scene following the Torrey Canyon disaster and 
the Santa Barbara off-shore drilling oil spills in 1969.”). 
 86. Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 102, 84 Stat. 91 (1970) (formerly codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1161) 
(superseded by Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 2, Pub. L. No. 92-
500, 88 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (2012))). 
 87. See, e.g., Reiter et al., supra note 81, at 1196–1200; Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. GL 
00 02 01 73, Commercial General Liability Coverage Form, Exclusion (f) (1973), reprinted in 
MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 13, at 366. 
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water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, 
release or escape is sudden and accidental.88 
In general, under this exclusion, claims related to environmental 
damage are not covered unless the event giving rise to the damage was 
“sudden and accidental.”  
The use of the phrase “sudden and accidental” in the exclusion is 
an example of rote reuse of boilerplate language in standardized 
insurance policies. The phrase previously had been used in Boiler and 
Machinery insurance policies and had a judicially established meaning: 
“courts uniformly had construed the phrase to mean unexpected and 
unintended.”89 Thus, when the phrase was transplanted to CGL 
policies in the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion, it already 
was understood to mean “unexpected and unintended” in the 
insurance context.  
In sum, when the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion was 
created, the definition of “occurrence” already limited coverage to 
injuries or damage that were “neither expected nor intended from the 
standpoint of the insured”90 and the phrase “sudden and accidental” 
was understood to mean unexpected and unintended. Consequently, 
when seeking approval of the new exclusion, it is unsurprising that 
insurers told state insurance commissioners across the country that the 
new exclusion was not a reduction in coverage for pollution claims, but 
rather, was only a “clarification” of the coverage provided under CGL 
policies.91 For example, in a June 10, 1970 letter to the Georgia State 
Insurance Commissioner, the insurance industry stated: 
[T]he impact of the [pollution exclusion clause] on the vast majority 
of risks would be no change. It is rather a situation of clarification. . . . 
Coverage for expected or intended pollution and contamination is not 
 
 88. Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. GL 00 02 01 73, Commercial General Liability 
Coverage Form, Exclusion (f) (1973), reprinted in MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 13, at 366. 
 89. New Castle Cty. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1197 (3d Cir. 1991), 
abrogated by N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Aardvark Assocs., Inc., 942 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1991); see STEVEN 
PLITT ET AL., 10A COUCH ON INSURANCE § 150:30 (3d ed. 2017) (“When coverage is limited to 
a sudden ‘breaking’ of machinery, the word ‘sudden’ should be given its primary meaning as a 
happening without previous notice or as something coming or occurring unexpectedly as 
unforeseen or unprepared for. That is, ‘sudden’ is not to be construed as synonymous with 
instantaneous.”)). 
 90. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 91. See, e.g., Reiter et al., supra note 81, at 1200–05 (discussing the insurance industry’s 
representations regarding the scope of the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion); Morton 
Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 848–53 (N.J. 1993) (same); Joy Techs., 
Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 421 S.E.2d 493, 498–99 (W. Va. 1992) (same). 
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now present as it is excluded by the definition of occurrence. 
Coverage for accidental mishaps is continued. . . .92 
As a mere “clarification” regarding the existing scope of coverage 
provided under CGL policies for pollution claims, insurers did not 
provide a reduction in premiums in exchange for the addition of the 
new exclusion.93  
The insurers’ position regarding the meaning of “sudden and 
accidental” changed, however, when they were confronted with 
countless lawsuits with hundreds of billions of dollars at stake in 
widespread environmental insurance coverage litigation in the 1980s 
and 1990s.94 The onslaught of environmental insurance coverage 
litigation occurred because the landscape regarding liability for 
environmental claims dramatically changed within a few years of the 
addition of the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion to CGL 
policies.  
In 1976, Congress passed the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA).95 In 1980, the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) was passed 
and, in 1986, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 
(SARA) was passed (collectively, these environmental statutes are 
known as the “Superfund” laws).96 The Superfund laws imposed 
retroactive, strict, and joint and several liability for the cleanup of 
environmental injuries on a variety of entities: (1) the current owners 
and operators of disposal facilities, (2) the owners or operators of 
disposal facilities during the time of the disposal, (3) the entities that 
arranged for the disposal or treatment of hazardous materials, and (4) 
the transporters of hazardous materials.97 These new environmental 
laws created hundreds of billions of dollars of liabilities for 
 
 92. Morton, 629 A.2d at 853 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Claussen v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 676 F. Supp. 1571, 1573 (S.D. Ga. 1987)).  
 93. See, e.g., id. at 848, 853; Reiter et al., supra note 81, at 1202. 
 94. See, e.g., Reiter et al., supra note 81, at 1171 (noting that the estimated industry liability 
for the environmental cleanup was $150 billion to $700 billion). 
 95. Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482, 94 Stat. 2334; 
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (current 
versions of both amendments can be found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992 (2012)). 
 96. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012). 
 97. See, e.g., O’Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 1989) (discussing CERCLA’s 
retroactive and joint and several liability); United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1506 
(6th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 
1987) (discussing CERCLA’s imposition of strict, and joint and several liability). 
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policyholders almost overnight.98 Policyholders, in turn, demanded 
that their CGL insurers pay such liabilities. 
When faced with a bill for hundreds of billions of dollars, insurers 
took the position that the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion 
unambiguously precluded coverage for any and all environmental 
liabilities unless such liabilities resulted from “abrupt” releases of 
contaminants.99 Because the strict liability version of contra 
proferentem that often applies in insurance disputes means insurers 
lose if the policy language at issue is ambiguous, the law essentially 
forced insurers to take the position that the exclusion was 
unambiguous.100 As a corollary to that maxim, insurers also refused to 
produce any documents or allow discovery regarding the original 
drafters’ intent regarding the meaning of the exclusion because 
extrinsic evidence should not be relevant or discoverable if the policy 
language was unambiguous.101  
Policyholders, on the other hand, disputed that “sudden” 
unambiguously means “abrupt” by pointing out that “sudden” also can 
mean “unexpected.”102 Policyholders then requested documents from 
state insurance commissioners and successfully moved to compel the 
production of the drafting history from ISO and insurers regarding the 
exclusion to see whether the insurers’ litigation position was consistent 
with: 1) the original intent and purpose of the exclusion, and 2) 
insurers’ statements to state insurance commissioners regarding the 
exclusion.103 Of course, once obtained, the actual historic record 
 
 98. See, e.g., Reiter et al., supra note 81, at 1171. 
 99. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 711 A.2d 45, 52 (Del. Super. 
Ct. 1995) (“[Insurers] argue the term ‘sudden’ in the exception to the pollution exclusion has a 
temporal meaning synonymous with ‘abrupt’ . . . .”); Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. 
of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 852 (N.J. 1993) (noting that insurers’ position was that CGL policies only 
covered pollution if the releases causing the pollution were abrupt); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Republic 
Ins. Co., 929 P.2d 535, 538 (Wyo. 1996) (stating that insurers contend “sudden incorporates a 
temporal element”); Reiter et al., supra note 81, at 1174 (noting that insurers generally argue that 
“sudden” means “abrupt” or “happening quickly”). 
 100. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 101. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,711 A.2d at 54 (noting that the policyholder 
only obtained drafting history documents regarding the Sudden and Accidental Pollution 
Exclusion after successfully moving to compel their production). 
 102. See, e.g., id. at 52 (“DuPont argues the term ‘sudden’ is ambiguous, and the [c]ourt should 
interpret ‘sudden’ to mean ‘unexpected.’”); Sinclair Oil Corp., 929 P.2d at 538 (stating that the 
policyholder “contends the term is ambiguous because although sudden can mean ‘abrupt’ or 
‘happening quickly’ it can also mean ‘unexpected’”). 
 103. See, e.g., Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 623 A.2d 
1128, 1130 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992) (“ISO produced approximately 250,000 to 275,000 pages of 
responsive documents, which had been previously collected for production by ISO and contained 
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regarding the origins of the exclusion belied the insurers’ litigation 
position that the term “sudden” in the Sudden and Accidental 
Pollution Exclusion exclusively and unequivocally means “abrupt.”104  
The story of the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion is an 
exemplar regarding the formula for the creation of contractual black 
holes. First, information regarding the original intent and purpose of a 
phrase is lost through concealment or the passage of time. Then, the 
drafters of the contractual language—ISO in this instance—elect not 
to revise the language despite a patent or latent ambiguity in the 
language. Indeed, ISO continued to decline to revise the Sudden and 
Accidental Pollution Exclusion for over a decade while numerous 
courts construed the exclusion in completely inconsistent ways.105 ISO 
finally changed the language in the exclusion after the insurers’ 
litigation position regarding the meaning of the language had been 
rejected by numerous courts and insurers had been held liable for 
billions of dollars associated with environmental cleanups.106  
 
material related to the development of CGL language prior to March of 1983 and pollution 
coverage and exclusion language prior to December 1985.”); Morton, 629 A.2d at 848–53 
(discussing the documentation regarding insurers’ statements to state insurance commissioners 
about the regulatory approval of the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion); Joy Techs., 
Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 421 S.E.2d 493, 498–99 (W. Va. 1992) (same). 
 104. See, e.g., Morton, 629 A.2d at 875 (applying regulatory estoppel to prevent the insurers 
from taking a position regarding the meaning of “sudden and accidental” that was inconsistent 
with their representations to state insurance commissioners); Joy, 421 S.E.2d at 500 (same). 
 105. Compare Hecla Mining Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1092 (Colo. 1991) (en banc) 
(“Although ‘sudden’ can reasonably be defined to mean abrupt or immediate, it can also 
reasonably be defined to mean unexpected and unintended. Since the term ‘sudden’ is susceptible 
to more than one reasonable definition, the term is ambiguous, and we therefore construe the 
phrase . . . against the insurer . . . .”), and Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686, 690 
(Ga. 1989) (“In sum, we conclude that the pollution exclusion clause is capable of more than one 
reasonable interpretation. The clause must therefore be construed in favor of the insured to mean 
‘unexpected and unintended.’”), with Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. ARTRA Grp., Inc., 659 A.2d 
1295, 1308 (Md. 1995) (“We agree with the interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause 
adopted in numerous other cases. . . . Under those interpretations, the language of such an 
exclusion provides coverage only for pollution which is both sudden and accidental. It does not 
apply to gradual pollution. . . .”), and Upjohn Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 476 N.W.2d 392, 397 (Mich. 
1991) (“We find persuasive the recent opinions . . . which find the terms of the pollution exclusion 
to be unambiguous. We conclude that when considered in its plain and easily understood sense, 
‘sudden’ is defined with a ‘temporal element that joins together conceptually the immediate and 
the unexpected.’” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)). 
 106. See Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 00 01 11 85, Commercial General Liability 
Coverage Form, Exclusion (f) (1986), reprinted in MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 13, at 374 
(reflecting the change from the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion to the Absolute 
Pollution Exclusion in ISO’s 1986 CGL policy form); see also OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 
61, at 1896–1900 (citing decisions in 14 states where courts rejected the insurers’ litigation position 
regarding the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason and 
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Ultimately, the massive litigation regarding the Sudden and 
Accidental Pollution Exclusion prevented the exclusion from 
becoming a contractual black hole because the insurers’ position 
regarding the origin and meaning of the language in the exclusion was 
proven to be inconsistent with reality. The result, however, could have 
been completely different. The exclusion could have become another 
contractual black hole through rote reuse of language and the passage 
of time. It did not, however, because the litigation regarding the 
meaning of the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion occurred 
fairly soon after the exclusion was drafted. In addition, the 
policyholders had the resources and tenacity to force the insurance 
industry to produce the documentation regarding the original intent 
and meaning of the exclusion.  
CONCLUSION 
The potential for contractual black holes to appear in standardized 
commercial contracts is real. Insurance policies are fertile ground for 
the creation of contractual black holes. Many policies are drafted by a 
centralized organization—ISO—and the policy language is reused by 
rote decade after decade. As non-drafters of the policy language, the 
insurers that use the ISO policy forms often do not even know what the 
policy language means themselves.  
The rote reuse of policy language then becomes a self-
perpetuating cycle because a strict liability version of contra 
proferentem often applies in insurance disputes. This dictates that 
insurers always take the position that policy language is unambiguous. 
Consequently, there is a disincentive for insurers to revise policy 
language because any changes to it could be viewed as an admission 
that the old language was ambiguous. Over time, as the policy language 
becomes antiquated and begins to lose meaning, it is reused 
nonetheless.  
This dynamic, combined with the increasingly complex structure 
and organization of policies, has resulted in policies, as a whole or in 
part, appearing to be contractual black holes. An examination of the 
 
Pollution: Correctly Construing the “Absolute” Exclusion in Context and in Accord with Its 
Purpose and Party Expectations, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 1–2 (1998) (“Responding to the flurry of 
environmental litigation over the application of the “sudden and accidental” pollution exclusion, 
the insurance industry during the mid-1980s largely adopted new standard pollution exclusion 
language for commercial general liability (CGL) policies. Since the mid-1980s, the standard form 
CGL has included the so-called absolute pollution exclusion. . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
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Non-Cumulation Clause, Sue and Labor Clause, Ensuing Loss Clause, 
and the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion demonstrates that 
some policy provisions have become contractual black holes, some 
provisions are only apparent contractual black holes, and some 
provisions were saved before they became black holes.  
 
